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Abstract 
 In this paper we operationalize and empirically test six core tenets of 
pacification theory derived from Marxian political economy using time series 
data for the USA from 1972-2009. Our analysis confirms that rising inequality is 
statistically significantly correlated to increased public and private policing over 
time and that increased public and private policing is also statistically 
significantly correlated to increased industrial exploitation as measured through 
“surplus-value”. While unionization correlates to strikes and lock-outs which 
suggests that unions have an important mobilizing role for the industrial reserve 
army, unionization also inversely correlates to total policing employment.  As 
union membership decreases, policing employment increases, which gives 
credence to the notion that unions may also act as policing agents for capital. 
We conclude that when these findings are coupled with our previous 
international research of 45 countries for the snapshot year of 2004 (Rigakos 
and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, there appears to be 
significant empirical support for pacification theory.  The relationships we have 
discovered recur both across time and international contexts despite the fact 
that variations in legal norms and institutional histories of policing are varied 
and complex.  
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 It is now accepted wisdom that the widening gap between rich and poor in the 
United States is a matter of significant public policy concern (Thompson, 2012). The ‘gap’ 
issue has been embraced by liberal thinkers as one of equity (Huffington, 2011), by 
venture capitalists as one of sufficient consumption and the spectre of economic 
stagnation (Buffet, 2012), and by security experts as one of national stability.  Witnessing 
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falling real wages alongside soaring profits, of course, comes as no surprise to critical 
political economists (e.g. Wolff, 2011) who have long held that if capitalism were 
deregulated, left to its own devices, and allowed to operate unfettered, it would produce 
gross disparities in relative wealth and income.  In Marx and Engel’s (1850) terms 
“[s]ociety as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two 
great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat”.  In the United 
States, resultant political discussions about the decline of the ‘middle class’ have turned to 
a more progressive income tax system as a solution (Buffet, 2012) that might act as a 
leveler for inequality and a method by which worker insecurity may be alleviated. Yet, 
worker insecurity is of significant benefit to capitalists both domestically and 
internationally (e.g. Klein, 2008).  After all, worker uncertainty and exploitation is 
considered ‘productive’ for the economy as it significantly tempers demands and drives 
down real wages.  Capitalism ushers in “everlasting uncertainty and agitation” (Marx and 
Engels, 1850).  In this way, we might say that an insecure workforce is one important step 
toward a pacified workforce. It is therefore the nature of capitalism to engage in warfare 
(both open and subterranean) against its workers in order to produce a consistent, 
beneficial insecurity: a state of anxiety that can only ostensibly be satiated by 
consumption.  In fact, during the economic bubble of the late 1990s and just ahead of the 
Great Recession, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan argued that “growing 
worker insecurity” played a pivotal role in workers’ having stopped asking for wage 
increases which was by extension beneficial for US capital (Uchitelle, 1997).  Of course, 
this insecurity took place during a period that witnessed a massive rise in corporate 
profits, a decline in real income (Wolff, 2011) and consistent increases in public and 
private policing (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011). 
  In this paper, we build upon our previous international research (Rigakos and 
Ergul, 2011) that investigated the relationships between four resilient and seemingly 
unrelated trends: (1) the consistent erosion of union-membership; (2) an increase in 
income polarization and inequality; (3) a dramatic resurgence in popular protest; and (4) 
a steady rise in public and private policing employment. We analyze the relationship 
between these variables in the context of a theory of pacification which argues that the 
role of “policing”, broadly defined, has both historically and contemporaneously been 
designed to “make workers productive” (Rigakos, 2011) by “fabricating a social order” 
(Neocleous, 2000) that seeks to protect private property relations in support of bourgeois 
interests.  In this sense, we treat total policing employment in the United States as an 
empirical barometer of bourgeois insecurity conditioned by two elements of Marxian 
political economy: (1) relative deprivation (income inequality) and (2) the rise of an 
industrial reserve army, or manufacturing unemployment through successive 
deindustrialization.   We also examine how both worker exploitation (as measured by 
surplus value) and labour militancy (as measured by strikes and lockouts per 100,000 
population) interact with declining union membership.  Our goal, in the simplest terms, 
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is to empirically test the central tenets of pacification theory through a statistical 
examination of macroeconomic trends in the United States from 1972 to 2009. 
 This paper is organized into five sections.   The first section introduces the reader 
to the basic theoretical tenets of pacification and policing. For us, the most important 
aspect of this review is to glean from the perspective a number of assertions that may be 
operationalized in a manner that will allow us to statistically test their veracity against our 
available U.S. time-series data. The general relationships measured in this paper all 
revolve around policing employment as a contemporary barometer of bourgeois 
insecurity, yet it is important to note that this is only one aspect of the broad project of 
police and its relationship to capital. The next section on methodology outlines our 
approach. More specifically, we lay out the various sources for the variables we examine 
including our calculations for creating second-order variables, such as surplus value and 
cumulative deindustrialization.  The following three sections, entitled “inequality”, 
“surplus-value” and “de-unionization and deindustrialization” explain and contextualize 
the results of our analysis. 
 
Policing as Pacification 
 
 Pacification is the continuum of police violence upon which the fabrication of 
capitalist order is planned, enforced and resisted.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
pacification as a state or sovereign action that attempts ‘to put an end to strife or 
discontent’ and ‘to reduce to peaceful submission’ a rebellious population.  Neocleous 
(2011: 38) argues that the Dictionary’s reference to the Edicts of Pacification of 1563, 1570 
and the Edict of Nantes in 1598 as the first instances of the usage of the word ‘pacification’ 
are important because “they are the point of departure for the period in which the 
insecurity of bourgeois order had to be secured.”  It is at this point that a politics of 
security, a need to fabricate an order necessary for the functioning of the bourgeois state 
becomes central to the development of liberal philosophy both domestically and 
imperially (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011). Pacification was to be achieved through a 
science of police that aimed to proactively shape a new social order.   
 This police science (Polizeiwissenschaft) has a rich analytic history, going back to 
the 17th century, that is tied to the development of a technical need to order populations 
and to fabricate conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation. Much of what we now 
come to understand as policing is based on Enlightenment thought concerning the best 
organization of populations for the “welfare of all” and the maximization of wealth either 
for an absolutist monarchy or, later, as part of the market dynamics of a liberal state.  
These organizing principles of police and capital have historically revolved around an 
intentional class-based ordering, including the proper establishment of work-houses, the 
best method of keeping accounts of persons and goods as well as their movements, the 
formation of a pauper police, and the systematic categorization of worthy and unworthy 
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poor.  These innovations in police thinking played a prominent and pronounced role in 
the establishment of the 19th century constabulary that the English-speaking world, 
including the United States, has inherited.  The “new police” of London were a bourgeois 
innovation that were made necessary by an unregulated migration of “masterless men” 
and other “vagabonds” to the emerging industrial heartlands of England.  The police were 
set up to methodically inculcate a wage-labour system that made wealth accumulation 
more predictable.  The great police thinker Patrick Colquhoun sought to set up a system 
of enforcement as a method to regulate the compensation of labour conducive to capital 
accumulation.  At the heart of 19th century imperial England, Colquhoun set about 
creating an experimental police that would replace “chips and perquisites” of all types 
among dock workers and that would enforce a dress code and system of inspection that 
would “eliminate pilfering” altogether.  Colquhoun’s methods were centred on the 
enforcement of wage labour and his success was catalogued empirically.  As Rigakos 
(2011: 70-1) notes, Colquhoun “clearly realized that social control… was geared to the 
benefit of a particular class of property holders” and that this was “consistent with his 
emphasis on managing the various classes of persons who he said threatened commercial 
interests.” Thus, the main target and concern of police has, from its inception, been the 
working class and the poor. “That is, its mobilizing work was the mobilization of work” 
(Neocleous, 2000: 20).  
 Colquhoun, however, was also an imperialist. A former Virginia colonist and 
Loyalist, he even raised an army out of Scotland to assist in putting down the American 
rebellion.  Like other police intellectuals, Colquhoun focused on both imperial planning 
by means of fabricating a wage-labour system and putting an end to domestic instability 
(see Rigakos et al., 2009).  He was, in the strictest sense, both a theorist and practitioner of 
pacification.  In the American context, labour unrest and its policing also has a very long 
history.  Like the British context, there were experiments with private policing, such as 
the Coal and Iron Police, who worked directly for industrial interests and were often 
brutal in their methods of strike-breaking and unscrupulously infiltrating and 
undermining worker associations (Friedman, 1907).  As American railroad baron and 
financier Jay Gould once put it: “I can hire one half the working class to kill the other 
half.” When private security companies such as the notorious Pinkerton Detective 
Agency (Morn, 1982) proved too controversial and local guardsmen proved too 
unpredictable by galvanizing further resistance (Hogg, 1944), states across the union 
began to move to state-level law enforcement in an effort to create a more centralized, less 
locally dependent, and ‘professional’ service (Couch, 1981). In the same way it was clear 
to workers and political agitators in nineteenth century London, it was not lost on 
American labour activists of the day that the legislative move towards the use of state 
“troopers” and “rangers” was a direct threat to their ability to mobilize.  At every step, 
pacification anticipates resistance. 
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 It is within this historical backdrop, both domestic and international, that the 
interconnected role of police and capital can be viewed as part of a large-scale project of 
pacification.  Thus, there are at least six tenets that may be distilled from current thinking 
about pacification that are useful to our study: 
 
1) Public-private.  Given their institutional interchangeability yet identical targets of 
enforcement, to rigidly distinguish between public versus private forms of policing is to 
further reify a false binary that obfuscates far more than it reveals. Put another way: “The 
public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The 
question is therefore not ‘public versus private’ or ‘civil society versus the state’, but the 
unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the 
name of security” (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 15-16).  In the context of both 
pacification and a Marxian political economy (see Rigakos and Ergul 2011: 338-340) it 
makes no sense to operationalize public and private policing separately2 and so, in this 
paper, we operationalize public and private policing employment into one variable.  
  
2) Inequality. The more capitalism naturally matures the more unequal the distribution 
of wealth.  Adam Smith admitted as much but defended the emergent class distinctions 
that sprang from early capitalism by unapologetically arguing that the “accommodations” 
of “an industrious and frugal peasant” always “exceed[ed] that of many an African king, 
the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages” (Smith 1937: 
18).  He held that absolute poverty is reduced wherever capitalism flourished. Marx, 
however, (1977: 33) pointed out that poverty was relative rather than absolute arguing 
that since our gains and possessions “are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.”  
Despite the fact that “living conditions may have improved for the lowest rungs of society, 
they improved much more significantly for the bourgeoisie whose source of wealth was 
directly tied to the exploitation of workers” (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 341).  If policing is 
aimed at the fabrication of an order that seeks to promote capital accumulation and the 
valorization of private property then the larger the threat to that order the greater the 
aggregate need to secure it.  Rising inequality is a threat to the capitalist order because it 
amplifies relative deprivation.  For us, this means that, over time, unfettered capitalist 
systems become more and more unequal and as they do so this inequality, if not 
                                                          
2 In his historical examination of private detective industrial policing in the US from 1850-1940, Weiss 
(1978: 63) argues that “the public/private distinction can be seen as bogus” even though “this arrangement 
has had decided benefits in upholding the interests of capital”.  Similarly, in his analysis of the Coal and 
Iron Police, Couch (1981: 90) asserts that the move to state policing was as a result of the need to 
“guarantee stability of class and property relations” when the company cops proved too controversial. In 
the end, public and private police have historically been used interchangeably in the American pacification 
of the working class. 
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addressed by other means, must necessarily occur alongside more and more policing.  
Inequality will positively correlate to total policing. 
 
3) Surplus value. Long before the Thames River police and in the preceding pre-capitalist 
economic epochs some form of coercion has always been required to realize a surplus 
(Rigakos et al., 2009). The historical and institutional goal of police science, both in terms 
of planning and enforcement, is to produce an environment conducive to the promotion 
of capital accumulation, to make workers productive.  This is accomplished by facilitating 
the practice of exploitation necessary for the functioning of the capitalist system.  
Exploitation, in Marxist terms, is unpaid labour time or surplus value: the amount of time 
that a worker works without getting paid and for which the capitalist realizes a surplus 
(Marx, 1972).  A system of police is vital to the extraction of surplus value because it is 
based on the use and threat of coercive force.  Surplus value will positively correlate to 
total policing. 
 
4) (De-)Unionization. There is ambivalence among Marxian thinkers about the relative 
role of unions with respect to the revolutionary goals of the proletariat.  Gramsci (1968: 
34) argued that unions “cannot be the instrument[s] for a radical renovation of society”.  
Luxemburg (1971:68) lamented that unions suffered from a “bureaucratism and a certain 
narrowness of outlook” because their goal was to ameliorate and resolve class conflict as 
much as possible.  Trotsky (1974: 43) chastized “the reformist bureaucracy and the labour 
aristocracy who pick the crumbs from its banquet table” and derisively dubbed this 
emerging labour aristocracy the “lieutenants of capital” (Trotsky 1969: 54).  By 1872, 
Marx (1987: 90-93) complained in his speech to the General Council of the International 
Workers’ Association that “[t]rade unions are praised too much; they must in the future 
be treated as affiliated societies and used as centers of attack in the struggle of labour 
against capital.”  Despite these critiques Marxian scholars still held out hope for a 
radicalized union movement that would assist a revolutionary socialism. In our own 
previous work we have argued that “[i]n sum, the general position toward trade unions by 
Marxists is that unions alone cannot be the vehicles for the radical transformation of the 
social relations of production” because by “their very nature trade unions do not seek to 
unleash the war between the bourgeois and the proletarian classes but rather act to keep 
the peace: to behave, as Trotsky put it, as policing agents for capital” (Rigakos and Ergul, 
2011: 334).  If we are to believe that unions are indeed agents of capital, then they also 
acquire a police function in society and so we should see that more union membership 
per capita will result in lower police employment numbers, and the inverse should also be 
true.  Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing. 
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5) The industrial reserve army. It is fair to say that there has been no greater 
preoccupation among the police scientists of the Enlightenment than with that of the idle, 
the indigent and the poor.  To a large extent, planning for control over and policing of 
vagabonds and masterless men, the creation of policy to discern between the deserving 
and undeserving poor, and motivating people classified in these categories to become 
productive have guided much thinking about the proper use and deployment of police 
(Neocleous, 2000).  Marx also had much to say about this reserve army of workers for 
they act as both a pressure release on the demands of workers by lowering expectations – 
lest they be replaced by the unemployed – and also appear as a threat to the system itself 
by acting as a ready reservoir of agitated revolutionaries.  Marxian historians have offered 
significant insights into how the emergent bourgeois state made it a central organizing 
mission to pacify this body of transient workers through forced migration, immigration 
policy and the use of public and private police to crush revolutionary agitation (see 
Couch, 1981; Weiss, 1978).  Both in the formative logics of bourgeois systems of police 
and within the radical philosophy of revolutionary politics, the industrial reserve army 
plays a pivotal role.  Much of the revolutionary fervor of the nineteenth century around 
the unemployed and this persists today.  Strikes and lockouts may act as catalysts for 
revolutionary actions (Priestland, 2009) and union agitation becomes paramount; yet, 
with ever-decreasing union membership it is likely that strikes and lock-outs will also 
become less frequent. Following from the above we can hypothesize: Unionization will 
positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs and cumulative deindustrialization will 
positively correlate to total policing. 
 We have now laid out six tenets of Marxian political economy, generally, and 
pacification more precisely.  We have operationalized these tenets in a hypothetico-
deductive manner for the purpose of statistical testing.  We must admit, however, that in 
setting up these hypotheses we have been significantly aided by our previous 
international research (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011) that investigated identical relationships 
across 45 countries for the comparative “snapshot” year 2004. In that study we sought to 
develop a “nascent theory” with the “exploratory” aim of producing an empirically-
grounded Marxian political economy of policing.  This study, therefore, builds directly on 
that international study in that we are far more confident of the veracity and explanatory 
power of Marxian political economy and believe that pacification theory effectively 
captures what we were already seeking to map analytically: the material, macroeconomic 
connections between police and capital.  We are also taking two important analytic steps 
by choosing to conduct a time-series study of the United States.  First, pacification theory 
demands that we take stock of what is happening in the heart of Empire (i.e., Hardt and 
Negri, 2001) – the domestic is the imperial according to pacification (Neocleous and 
Rigakos, 2011: 17).  Second, while discovering significant relationship between police and 
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capital transnationally is indeed significant, it would further solidify our claims if similar 
relationships were observed over time in a single national context. 
 
Methodology 
 
 We have already gone some way in the preceding section toward mapping out 
how we intend to operationalize concepts gleaned from Marxian political economy and 
pacification by translating these notions into empirically testable hypotheses.  Here, we 
detail the source data used in the analysis.  Our variables are as follows: (1) total policing 
employment per 100,000 population which is the sum of (a) public police employment 
per 100,000 population and (b) private security employment per 100,000 population; (2) 
inequality; (3) surplus value; (4) union membership; (5) cumulative deindustrialization 
(which is the cumulative annual difference of manufacturing job losses subtracted from 
manufacturing job gains); and (6) strikes and lock-outs. 
 Our data-set generally reflects a time-series analysis of the United States from 
1972-2009.  Prior to 1972, there is no reliable annual statistical information on public 
police or private security employment in the United States other than national census 
data.  Similar gaps are present with data on manufacturing job losses and gains.3  While 
the variables used in this study equate to those in our previously published international 
study (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011), the sources have changed, as has the construction of one 
key indicator: the industrial reserve army.  Our decision to employ a longitudinal analysis 
in this article has led us to replace our manufacturing unemployment variable with a new 
“cumulative deindustrialization” measure. The reason for such an alteration derives from 
the statistical restrictions that the use of manufacturing unemployment data generates in 
a longitudinal analysis. The Current Population Survey produces “unemployment by 
industry” data by asking for the identification of the last job that the persons participating 
the survey held. This poses a problem for our longitudinal analysis because people who 
were laid-off from manufacturing sector employment could be hired and again laid-off 
from jobs in another sector prior to the survey. Considering that displacement is a major 
issue for manufacturing sector employees (Brauner, 2008), manufacturing 
unemployment as a variable loses its reliability over time. Therefore, in our analysis, we 
have created a measure of cumulative deindustrialization: which, as mentioned, is the net 
change in deindustrialization calculated by subtracting the annual “job destruction” or 
job losses from “job creation” or job gains. It is a cumulative measure because we add the 
number of each year’s net change to the following year. 
                                                          
3 It should be noted that there are isolated data points where earlier statistics are available for certain 
variables.  Whenever available, we make use of these data-points though they are sometimes not shown 
graphically. 
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 Our data are gleaned from the following pre-existing data sources: Public police 
and private security data are added to make up our measure of total policing.  They are 
derived from: (1) a combination of census and FBI Law Enforcement Employment 
Bulletins and (2) Occupational Employment Statistics by the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
(BLS).  For inequality, we used the Gini coefficient from the Income Inequality database, 
Earnings and Poverty Reports. The Gini coefficient is currently the most widely used 
measure of income inequality. It is the ratio of the area under a line of equality where one 
axis is the cumulative share of income and the other axis is the cumulative share of people 
from the lowest to the highest. It produces a range from zero to one which is often 
multiplied by 100 (we also use this convention in our Graphs).  The higher the Gini 
coefficient, the higher the rate of income inequality. 4  The data required for the 
calculation of surplus value consists of the number of employed production workers, 
manufacturing value added, and annual earnings of manufacturing workers (production 
workers). This is the most widely accepted measure by Marxian scholars.5  We also adopt 
this calculation. 
 
SV = 
(gross value added – total manufacturing workers’ 
earnings) 
total manufacturing workers’ earnings 
 
This data is retrieved mainly from: (1) Current Employment Statistics on Employment, 
Hours and Earnings, produced by BLS; (2) Gross Domestic Products Accounts by 
Industry, created by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; and (3) Annual Survey of 
Manufacturers and American Fact Finder, prepared by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Data 
regarding union-membership is retrieved from three major sources: (1) “Union 
Membership Trends” (Mayer, 2004); and (2) News Releases prepared by the BLS; and (3) 
“Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by State and Sector, 1983-
2011” (Hirsh and Macpherson, 2012). The data for “job destruction” and “job creation” as 
well as job losses and job gains which we add as a measure of cumulative 
deindustrialization is retrieved from Business Dynamics Statistics released by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, and Business Employment Dynamics Statistics produced by the BLS. 
National level data concerning strikes and lockouts is obtained from Economic News 
Releases produced by BLS.  
                                                          
4 For more detail on the calculation of Gini coefficient see Gini (1921). 
5 While there have been diligent attempts to more closely proximate the rate of surplus value using existing 
economic measures (Amsden, 1981; Cuneo, 1978, 1982, 1984; Lynch, 1987; Lynch, 1988; Moseley, 1985; 
Varley, 1938; Weisskopf, 1985; Wolff, 1975, 1979) we have chosen the simplest and most widely applicable 
measure adopted by Marxian scholars (Cueno, 1978; Lynch, 1988; Lynch, Groves and Lizotte, 1994). 
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 This is a simple correlational study.  While the nature of our general tenets 
sometimes hint at causality, our time-series data are insufficient to conduct multivariate 
tests.  Causality in a time-series can also be asserted by time-shifting backwards the 
presumed independent variable.  The strength of the associations we have discovered, 
however, would make this shifting rather artificial.  That is to say, where powerful and 
statistically significant relationships already exist, one or two-year shifts makes no 
difference in the result.  Causality may also be conveyed epistemically by demonstrating 
that an expected association is predicted by the theory.  In this case, as a direct function of 
the theoretical assertions being tested, from time to time we take liberties in this direction 
but it should always be remembered that our statistical tests are nonetheless correlational 
and not causal. 
 
Inequality 
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Since the late 1960s U.S. income disparity has become the widest among all major 
industrialized nations (Brandolini and Smeeding, 2006; Smeeding, 2005; Morris and 
Western, 1999)6. The Gini co-efficient rose from 38.6 in 1968 to 46.8 in 2009 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2010) to 46.9 in 2010 (Levine, 2012).  While this is the measure of inequality we 
use in this article, it is important to note that other measures have produced similar 
results. 
 Income disparity is also explained by a comparison of the ratio of the median 
income level (50th percentile) to that of 10th percentile income level (the ratio of 50-10) as 
well as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile (the ratio of 90-50). On the 
basis of this comparison, it is suggested that growth in overall income inequality is a 
result of those near the bottom of the distribution falling further behind the typical 
household income while those near the top are far ahead of the typical household 
income.7 Thus, according to Levine (2012:5), increased inequality in the upper half of the 
distribution might be accountable for most of the overall increase in inequality between 
1961 and 2002. Such pattern in which the benefits of economic growth are being accrued 
by largely those near the top of the income distribution has continued throughout 2007 
(Diaz-Gimenez, Rios-Rull and Glover, 2011). According to Census Bureau data, the 
bottom fifth quintile’s share of income has changed little – at less than 4% – for the last 
few decades. On the contrary, the income share of the top fifth quintile increased 
significantly. While the bottom 20%’s share of income was 4.2% in 1968, it fell to 3.3% in 
2010. In contrast, the top 20%’s share of income increased from 42.6% in 1968 to 50.2% 
in 2010. More importantly, the share of the top 5% rose from 16.3% in 1968 to an 
astonishing 21.3% in 2010. To put it more clearly, the top 5%’s income “accounted for 
more than four times the share it would have had in a perfectly equal distribution” 
(Levine, 2012). Moreover, the income share of the middle three quintiles (second to 
fourth) declined from 53.2% to 46.5% (Levine, 2012) while the income share of the top 
1% increased drastically from 8.35% in 1968 to 12.98% in 1990 to 17.42 in 2010 (Alverado, 
et. al., 2012). 
 The inevitable question in this context is: What has been driving the increase in 
income inequality in the United States? The two explanations most commonly offered for 
                                                          
6 Income inequality has increased throughout the world over the past three decades both within and 
between countries (Milanoviç and Kaya, 2007; Wade, 2004). Income inequality within countries was stable 
or declining from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, but it has increased sharply and steadily across the 
globe since (Galbraith, 2002; Galbraith, 2007; Wade, 2004). In advanced industrialized countries, the 
average income of the richest 10% is almost nine times that of the poorest 10%, a ratio of 9 to 1. The Gini 
co-efficient was 0.29 in OECD countries in the mid-1980s; however, it rose by almost 10% to 0.316 in the 
late 2000s (OECD, 2011). For more detail on the rising income inequality in the world see Berger, et al. 
(2010); Brandolini and Smeeding (2006); Smeeding (2002). However, neoliberal theorists refute the idea of 
the rising inequality in the world since 1980s. For more detail see Dollar (2005); Dollar and Kraay (2002); 
Nielsen (2007); Wolf (2000).  
7 For an analysis of individual income inequality trends in the US see Bryan and Martinez (2008). 
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the trend toward greater income inequality in the U.S. are: globalization and 
technological advancement (Levine, 2012). In the contemporary world, globalization is 
promoted through a neoliberal form of capitalism in which the goals of the economy are 
set as growth and development and these goals become possible mainly through openness 
to trade and investment. However, trade liberalization and financial globalization result 
in income inequality across the globe (Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). In the 
context of the U.S., the improvement of the conditions of free trade and flows of goods, 
services, and capital have placed less skilled U.S. workers in more vulnerable position by 
putting them in direct competition with less skilled workers abroad. Shifting the 
production of goods and services overseas has reduced demand for workers in the United 
States, and in turn put downward pressure on their wages (Levine, 2011; Levine, 2012).  
 The argument that is commonly found most convincing, among economists, in 
explaining rising inequality, across the globe and in the U.S., is technological change. 
Technological development, it is argued, has led to “the comparatively rapid growth in 
the wage premium paid to more highly skilled (productive) workers since 1979” (Levine, 
2012: 8). In other words, technological changes have resulted in turning information 
technology employees into low-skilled workers while raising the demand for high-skilled 
employees and thus increased their wages (Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Jaumotte, 
Lall and Papageorgiou, 2008). Here, the relationship between technological advancement 
and education is utilized in order to explain rising inequality. 
 Of course, these two explanations, i.e., globalization and technological 
development, cannot be separated from one another. For, as Marx and Engels (1992: 6) 
argue, “[t]he bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments 
of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations 
of society.” That is to say, the spaces of capital in which it operates, the social relations 
within which these operations take place, and “with them the whole relations of society” 
have to be continuously re-constructed, re-created, and re-structured as a response to the 
untameble desires of capital. Therefore, neither technological changes nor the processes 
of globalization can be divorced from capital and its needs.  
 A less popular explanation for the increasing wage inequality in the U.S. draws 
attention to the relationship between the decline of unionization and the increase in wage 
inequality and argues that “unions help to institutionalize norms of equity, reducing the 
dispersion of nonunion wages in highly unionized regions and industries” (Western and 
Rosenfeld, 2011: 1).8 While the union effect on inequality is alternately considered 
modest (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2008), indirect – through technological change 
(Acemoglu, 2002), or secondary – to the effects of other institutions, such as minimum 
                                                          
8 It should be noted that the U.S. and the UK are the countries with the largest decline in unionization rate, 
and they are also the countries that have experienced the largest increase in income inequality in the last 
three decades among the industrialized nations (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004). 
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wages (Card and DiNardo, 2002), or minute and primarily affecting men (Card, Lemieux 
and Riddell, 2004), the decline of unionization explains as much of the increase in 
inequaliy as the growing stratification of wages in relation to education (Bruce and 
Rosenfeld, 2011).  Considering the vitality of the effect of relative deprivation on the 
immiseration of multitudes in the Marxian theoretical framework, it is necessary for our 
analysis to examine the relation of income inequality, unionization and radicalization to 
state and corporate insecurities and their manifestation in the increasing numbers of 
public and private police. The growth of private security in the U.S. has been well-
documented (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1971; Cunningham, Strauchs and van Meter, 1990) 
as has the role of private security agents in both domestic and foreign pacification 
(Rigakos, 2011).  These activities, of course, have a long lineage (Couch, 1978) but today 
encompass increasingly concentrated (Rigakos, 2000; 2005) multinational security 
companies, parapolice (Rigakos, 2002) and private mercenary armies (Scahill, 2008) 
charged with overseas imperial projects.   
 Our time-series analysis of the U.S. from 1972 to 2009 demonstrates that there is 
an almost perfect positive correlation between total policing and inequality (r2= .940, 
n=36, p<.001, see Graph 1).  The strength of the association is quite astonishing.  In our 
international study we found that inequality was also statistically significantly positively 
correlated to total policing (r2=.344, n=43, p<.05) (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 356) 
although this association was not nearly as strong as in the U.S.  Our analysis 
demonstrates that increasing inequality in the U.S. has risen in almost synchronous 
lockstep with a rising body of public and private policing agents in the last four decades. 
 
Surplus-Value 
 
Surplus value is both the aggregate effect and the driving engine of capitalism.  In 
Marxian terms, capitalism does not exist without surplus value.  Surplus value is the 
unpaid labour-time a capitalist must steal from a worker in order to create profit or 
margin.  As a basic maxim of capitalism one must drive down labour costs to increase 
surplus, to maximize profits.  As inequality rises in the U.S. alongside declining 
unionization (as we shall see in the next section) it makes perfect sense to presume that 
this will facilitate the further economic exploitation of manufacturing workers.  Job losses 
breed insecurity which fuels wage concessions.  The more pacified the labour force, the 
more ‘productive’ it is in the eyes of capital.  But this widespread unease, immiseration 
and exploitation, as we have already mentioned, produces unease on the part of the 
bourgeoisie which necessitates more policing.   
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Our analysis of the U.S. shows a very strong positive correlation (r2= .855, n=39, p<.001, 
see Graph 2) between the rate of exploitation (the rate of surplus value) and policing.  We 
did not observe a similarly significant relationship in our international study (Rigakos 
and Ergul, 2011) though the direction was also positive.  This difference between the U.S. 
and the rest of the world may also be explained by intervening variables such as the 
relatively more well-developed social safety net in OECD countries, especially in Europe 
(Åslund, 2007) that may ameliorate the need for more policing in cases of higher 
exploitation through alternative state initiatives.  
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De-unionization and de-industrialization 
 
The industrial reserve army plays an important role in Marxian political economy – it 
acts as a calibrating body that drives down wages in times of economic downturn through 
heightened competition for work.  But these dispossessed industrial workers can also 
threaten the system of exploitation if organized – a proto-revolutionary force ready to 
seize the means of production.  Marx was contradictory in his assessment of the industrial 
versus the service sector.  While he (Marx, 1976: 1044) was quick to distance himself from 
Smith whom he accused of “fetishizing” the production of vendible commodities as 
supremely productive, he also later dismissed the service sector, leaving it entirely out of 
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his account and returning to manufacturing as “productive labour” par excellence (see 
Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: 331).  The industrial army, therefore, plays a key role in the 
sense that it makes goods, is most productive and ripe for revolutionary action.  
Understanding and measuring the industrial reserve army, that mass of workers made 
redundant by the rising organic composition of capital, and the rate of exploitation they 
indirectly help foster are thus central Marxian concerns.  The most important mechanism 
used by workers to offset this exploitative relationship is collective bargaining.  
 
  
  
  
 The origin of the labour movement in the U.S. can be traced back to the trade 
societies, or guilds, of the 18th century (Commons, et al., 1966). However, it was not until 
the early 19th century that American workers felt compelled to organize against their 
employers in order to protect themselves from falling wages in the face of rising prices, 
and to reduce work hours from twelve to ten (Zieger and Gall, 2002). Although these 
trade societies mounted an effective resistance against new capitalism they were, in effect, 
restricted “craft” unions. In the second half of the 19th century, however, the penetration 
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of the factory system, which led to the reduction of wages, the intensification of work, 
longer work hours, and strict discipline, generated the rise of a permanent factory 
proletariat. During the Civil War the strength of the labour movement increased. The 
number of trade unions rose from 79 to 270 between 1863 and 1864, and the estimated 
number of organized labour was over 200,000. These developments culminated in the 
establishment of the American Federation of Labour (AFL) in 1886 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 
1984). 
 The industrial expansion experienced in the U.S. between the Civil War and the 
end of the 19th century increased prosperity and improved standards of living for workers. 
However, as Marxian political economy predicts, capitalist growth never occurs without 
recurring depressions whose effects are mostly felt by the working class. Dulles and 
Dubofsky (1984) thus argue that the depressions of the 19th century increased workers’ 
persistence to form and sustain unions. However, the response to the efforts of workers to 
obtain recognition for their unions was very hostile, resulting in warfare between the 
workers and employers. Throughout this period, workers received no support from either 
federal or state governments, or from the courts.   Conversely, factory owners were 
endowed with the power to use police and military troops as well as private security – 
including the notorious Pinkerton Detective Agency (Morn, 1982; Hogg, 1944) against 
the labour unrest.9  In this context, most of the unions turned towards the protection of 
the AFL whose union practices were both restrictive to the affiliated unions and skilled-
workers, and exclusive toward the semi-skilled, unskilled, migrant, female, and black 
workers. 
 The 20th century came with promises of reform and peace in industrial relations10 
but in the face of the growing power of unions, capitalists altered their attitude of 
searching for peace in industrial relations and adopted destructive strategies and means – 
such as encouraging the use of “yellow dog” contracts, playing into ethnic-religious 
fractions within labour movement, exchanging blacklists of workers accused of having 
radical views, hiring detectives, special deputies and spies, and calling for court 
injunctions – through which they set organized labour back in almost all areas.11 The 
anti-unionism accompanied with the domination of the AFL within the organized labour 
                                                          
9 In the U.S., the 19th century was the century of violent encounters between workers and police forces – 
both public and private. To name a few: Tompkins Square Riot (1874), Haymarket Square Riot (1876), 
Great Railway Strike (1877), Rolling Mills Workers Strike (Bay View Tragedy) (1886), Sugar Cane Workers 
Strike (1887), Homestead Strike (1892). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984); Couch (1981); 
Weiss (1978). 
10 The period from 1901 to 1917 is called the “progressive era” in the U.S. (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 177). 
11 One of the most important allies of the employers during this period was the courts which generally made 
non-membership in a union a condition of employment, sustained the employers in their counterattacks to 
union boycotts with the claim that boycotts were a restraint on trade. Accordingly, the membership of the 
AFL declined in 1905 and remained the same for the next five years. For more detail see Dulles and 
Dubofsky (1984: 185-190). 
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made it almost impossible to organize or sustain a union of any significance in the most 
important industries, such as steel, automobiles, tobacco, machinery and electrical 
manufactures, public utilities, and meat- packing. This meant that more than 90% of the 
labour force in the U.S. was still unorganized. 12 
 The entrance of the U.S. in WWI created the conditions for organized labour to 
be officially recognized as an important player within the national economy. The Clayton 
Act (1914) exempted unions from prosecution under the anti-trust laws in recognizing 
the right to organize and to bargain collectively. President Wilson also established a 
National War Labour Board (NWLB) in 1918 to serve as a final court of appeal to settle 
all industrial disputes if they could not be solved through other means. These 
developments resulted in a gradual rise of wages and an increase in union membership to 
over a million from 1916 to 1919 (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 219). However, when 
wartime restraints were removed and the NWLB was disbanded, the contest between the 
workers and employers started anew. The year of 1919 witnessed an industrial strife on a 
scale greater than the country had ever experienced.13 The labour movement, which came 
out of the war organized and confident that with the government’s support it would be 
able to extend its rights, lost ground in the face of the capitalist counterattack since the 
governmental intervention and injunction laws were on the side of capital once again.14   
 The emergence of New Deal policies in the 1930s represented a change in the 
approach of the U.S. government to industrial relations. Following the principles set in 
                                                          
12 But, the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the emergence and growth of new unions, such as The 
United Mine Workers (UMW), the International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), and the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), whose fundamental goal was to eliminate the 
distinction between skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers, and to overcome the obstacles created by 
ethnic-religious fractions and gender issues within the union movement. These efforts had fundamental 
effects on the U.S. labour movement, the most important of which is the formation of the Committee for 
Industrial Organization (CIO) in 1935 as an alternative to the AFL.  For more detail see Dulles and 
Dubofsky (1984); Zieger and Gall, 2002). 
13 There were more than 3,500 strikes that were joined by over 4,000,000 workers in 1919 (Dulles and 
Dubofsky, 1984: 221). 
14 From 1920 to 1923, the union membership fell from over 5,000,000 to 3,500,000. For more detail see 
Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 220-232). Expanding production and prosperity between 1922 and 1929 meant 
increasing wages for workers and an increase in their purchasing power. Therefore, during 1920s, trade 
unions adopted a strategy of complying with the promises of economic expansion while capitalists started 
to see unions as a “regulatory mechanism” within industrial relations. The “regulatory unionism” was also 
called “the new unionism”, “trade-union capitalism”, “business unionism”,  “job conscious unionism”, or 
“class collaboration” in the U.S. This new unionism meant the restriction of union goals to narrowly 
defined immediate material issues, and the instrumentalization of unions by the capitalists as a means of 
policing the working class (Gordon, 1994). The number of strikes in 1928 was 604, which was the fewest on 
record in the U.S. labour movement history since 1884. In 1929, there were only 900 work stoppages 
involving just 1.2% of the labour force (Zieger and Gall, 2002: 45). 
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the Norris-La Guardian Act (NRA) (1932) 15, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
(1933) took a definite step toward implementing the right to organize and collective 
bargaining. The NIRA and the NRA did not go far enough to protect workers and so, a 
new act, the Wagner Act, or the National Labour Relations Act, was passed in 1935. This 
Act recognized and imposed “the right of wage earners to organize without making any 
such corresponding concessions to management as had been incorporated in the NIRA. 
It was prepared to strengthen the bargaining position of the workers” (Dulles and 
Dubofsky, 1984: 266). With this Act, it was finally recognized that labour could gain equal 
terms of bargaining power at the table with capital, only with the support of the 
government. The importance of this Act resides therefore not only in the affirmation of 
the right of workers to organize, but also in the banning of all employer attempts against 
the realization of this right. The significance of the 1930s for the labour movement can 
then be summarized as the establishment of the legal foundations for organized labour in 
industrial relations.16 
 At the beginning of 1940, the U.S. economy started to recover from the depression 
as a result of orders placed by the Western European countries for the ongoing war. Such 
orders led to a rise in production, a decrease in unemployment, and an increase in wages. 
The booming industry and growing union power prepared the stage for one of the most 
tumultuous years in the U.S. labour history. The number of labour disputes in 1941 
reached a higher total than any other year, except 1937. There were 4,288 strikes bringing 
together more than two million workers. In a pattern that would replicate itself time and 
time again, anti-unionist propaganda from capitalists framed these strikes as having 
paralyzing effects on national defense and therefore being un-democratic and un-
American.17 As a result, the National War Labour Board was established in 1942 (Dulles 
                                                          
15 The Norris-La Guardian Act is the embodiment of laws that aimed at profound changes in the role of 
federal government and federal institutions in the regulation of labour disputes. This Act consisted of 
banning of “yellow dog” contracts, barring the federal courts from issuing injunctions against nonviolent 
labour disputes, and creating a right of organization and collective bargaining for the industrial workers 
(Winter, 1960). Section 7 (a) of the Act states the recognition of the right to association and collective 
bargaining. The New Deal reformulated Section 7 (a) of this Act more carefully in the Wagner Act (1935) 
and the Fair Labour Standards Act (1938). For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 265-268). 
16 With the New Deal policies, the role of labour in politics had become more crucial than ever. Both the 
AFL and the CIO played a significant role in the re-election of Roosevelt in 1936. However, the close 
relationship between the President of the CIO, John L. Lewis, and Roosevelt cooled as a result of the U.S. 
foreign policy and the loosening of New Deal reforms. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984, 307-
311). 
17 Following the coal strike of 1941, anti-labour laws of different severity were passed in many states, and 
thirty bills were introduced in the Congress to curb union power (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 317). 
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and Dubofsky, 1984: 223-230; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 130-136) and organized labour was 
asked to surrender its right to strike (No-Strike Pledge) as a wartime necessity.18  
 After WWII, stable trade unions in mass production became essential for the 
smooth functioning of the economy.19 Increasing productivity and the U.S. economic 
domination facilitated rising capital accumulation, which made capitalists more agreeable 
to contracts with unions that guaranteed rising living standards. However, this did not 
mean that the corporate community’s distaste for the increasing power of organized 
labour ceased to exist. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 was the fruition of this opposition.20 
The Act directly aimed at the unions through banning closed shops, complicating the 
voting procedure for forming a union shop, and more importantly, leaving the door open 
for more severe anti-union legislations to be passed by the states.21 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
trade unions reached a peak point both in their social and political impact and in their 
overall membership. Private sector union density reached its peak at 36% in 1953 and 
1954 while many public employees joined trade unions during the same time (Hirsch, 
2010). The union membership rate for all wage and salary workers was at its highest 
(34.8%) in 1954 (Mayer, 2004).  However, it was not long before this process was 
systematically reversed. The U.S. has been experiencing a steady decline in trade union 
membership rates over the last forty years, reaching a seventy-year-low in 2010. This 
decline is seen largely as a private sector phenomenon (Lipset and Katchanovski, 2001; 
                                                          
18 Exceptions to this surrender occurred during the war. The most important one of which was the coal 
strike led by the United Mine Workers in 1943. The victory of the UMW in this strike resulted in the 
passing of the Smith-Connally Act (1943), whose goal was to limit economic and political power of 
organized labour. For more detail see Dulles and Dubofsky (1984: 325-329); Zieger and Gall (2002: 134). 
19 During this time, the struggles between the workers and employers were not as violent as previous times. 
The union officials functioned as “managers of discontent” and work stoppages were merely designed for 
the improvement of existing contractual relations (Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 334-341; Zieger and Gall, 
2002: 134-148). 
20 This Act guaranteed safeguards for the rights of the management. For example, employers were ensured 
full freedom of expression regarding union organization; they were also authorized to call for elections to 
determine the appropriate bargaining units in wage negotiations. Moreover, it was declared that any 
attempt of unions to coerce employers to collective bargaining was declared an unfair labour practice 
(Dulles and Dubofsky, 1984: 345; Zieger and Gall, 2002: 153). 
21 Section 14 (b) of the Act made the adoption of the “right-to-work” laws possible in various states. These 
laws made it “illegal for a group of unionized workers to negotiate a contract that requires each employee 
who enjoys the benefits of the contract terms to pay his or her share of costs for negotiating and policing 
the contract” (Gould and Shierholz, 2011: 1). Therefore, these laws did not only restrict the financial 
viability of unions but also decreased their ability to negotiate favorable contracts and benefits. Twelve 
states passed the so-called “right-to-work” laws within couple of years. Today, these laws are in place in 
twenty-two states in the United States, especially in the South and Southwest. Gould and Shierholz (2011) 
argue that in RTW states, wages are 3.2% lower, while the rate of employer sponsored health insurance is 
2.6% lower and the rate of employer-sponsored pension is 4.8% lower than those in non-RTW states. For 
discussion of the effects of RTW laws on union density, organizational activities and industrial 
development see Moore and Newman (1998); Moore and Newman (1985).   
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Farber and Western, 2001; Hirsch, 2010; Hirsch and Hirsch, 2006). According to Hirsch, 
the decline in private sector union density22 has been gradual, but unremitting. Union 
density in the private sector was 24.5% in 1973, 16.5% in 1983, 11.1% in 1993, reaching its 
lowest point at 6.9% in 2010.23 While private sector union density was in decline, public 
sector union density had increased rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s.24 Even though the size 
of the public sector has grown since the 1970s, union density has remained relatively 
constant, rising from 32.8% to 36.7% in 1983, and falling to 35.9% in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 
2-3).  Union membership rate of all wage and salary workers was 30.9% in 1960, 22.3% in 
1980, 12.9% in 2000 (Mayer, 2004) and 11.9% in 2010 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 
2011).25  
 These changes must be viewed within the overarching context of the 
intensification of production in the wake of a paradigm shift away from Keynesianism to 
neo-liberalism at the beginning of the 1980s. The macro-management of the economy 
and social protections as well as the regulation of the population by the government have 
been replaced by deregulation, decentralization and extensive privatization. As a result, 
the hospitable New Deal policies have been replaced with the enactment of discouraging, 
if not hostile, labour legislations, the decentralization of collective bargaining, labour 
market deregulation, and the flexibilization of production in capital-labour relations 
(Katz, 1993; Palley, 2005).  The steady increase in the rates of deunionization in the U.S. 
has been coupled with a precipitous decline in manufacturing employment. Marxist 
interpretations identify  the manufacturing sector as the source of productive labour par 
excellence and the prime vehicle for both capitalist growth and its demise.26 That is to say, 
manufacturing employment and unemployment speak directly to core Marxist maxims 
dealing with the rate of exploitation, value creation, and the composition of the industrial 
reserve army. Therefore, from the perspective of Marxist political economy, the process 
of deindustrialization and its implications on the workers is quite significant for an 
analysis whose attempt is to reveal the relationship between deunionization, policing and 
capital. 
                                                          
22 Union density demonstrates “the number of union members as a percentage of the number of people 
who could be potentially be union members” (Wallerstein and Western, 2000: 357). 
23 While union density fell in the private sector, nonunion wage and salary employment in the private sector 
increased from 47 million in1973 to 103 million in 2010 (Hirsch, 2010: 2). 
24 The increase in public sector union density is related to the enactment of public sector labour laws within 
the states and at the federal level. For more detail see (Freeman, 1986; Freeman and Valletta, 1988). 
25 Along with the decline of union membership, and hence organized labour, has come the decline in the 
number of strikes and lockouts. The number of major strikes and lockouts lasting one shift and involving 
1,000 or more workers was 424 in 1950, 222 in 1960, 381 in 1970, 187 in 1980, 44 in 1990, 39 in 2000 and 11 
in 2010 (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012).     
26 Marx has been widely criticized by contemporary scholars for his contradictory assertions about mental 
versus manual labour, productive versus unproductive labour. For more detail see Becker (1977); Carchedi 
(1977); Mandel (1975). 
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 The U.S. has also been experiencing a steady decline in the manufacturing sector’s 
share of overall employment since its all-time peak in 1979 (Baker, 2011).27 The job losses 
in the manufacturing sector have been even more substantial since 2000. Following the 
2001 recession, employment in manufacturing fell by 17%, and by the end of 2007 “had 
edged down further” (Brauner, 2008) and has continued to fall subsequently.28 This steep 
decline has been explained with reference to two interrelated factors: (1) rapid 
development in productivity, and (2) increased competition in the world market 
(Brauner, 2008; Fisher, 2004). Along with productivity growth and increase in global 
competitiveness, Brauner (2008) relates the decline in manufacturing employment to the 
imbalance between job losses and job gains. On the one hand, the rates of job losses had 
spiked during the 2001 recession and by the end of 2003 had fallen below the levels 
witnessed in the late 1990s and has remained low since then. On the other hand, the rate 
of job creation, which had began its decline in the late 1990s, has also continued its 
descend. Moreover, since the 1980s manufacturing workers have become an important 
part of the population of “displaced workers”.29 They have been more likely than other 
sector workers to be displaced, and those who had lost their jobs have been more likely 
than other sector employees to have remained jobless and have experienced significant 
losses in their earnings even when they have been reemployed (Brauner, 2008). 
 The development of American industrial production is the history of worker 
resistance and pacification.  Various eras have seen progress and regression by unions 
and workers.  In each of these historical formations, in the lead-up to, during and after 
the two World Wars, police force and legal authority have played a decisive role.  It is 
within this historical backdrop of pacification that we analyze the relationship between 
total policing, the unionization rate and strikes and lock-outs in the U.S. from 1972-
2009.30 
                                                          
27 The decline in the manufacturing sector employment is not unique to the U.S. On the contrary, all 
advanced industrial countries have been experiencing a steady decline in their manufacturing employment 
rates. For more detail see Bernard (2009); Commision of the European Communities (2009); Pilat, et al. 
(2006); van der Zee and Brandes (2007). 
28 The manufacturing sector lost 15% of its workforce during the period between December 2007 and June 
2009 (Baker, 2011). It is argued that although there has been a continuous decline in the manufacturing 
employment in the U.S. for almost over a half-a-century, manufacturing production and value-added 
continued to grow as a result of high productivity (Pilat, et al., 2006). Despite this high productivity rate, the 
share of the manufacturing sector in the total economic activity and value-added have continued to decline 
in Western economies due to increased economic integration, demographic effects, productivity growth 
and the fluctuations in exchange rates (Alderson, 1997; Brauner, 2008; Pilat, et al., 2006). 
29 Displaced workers are defined as “people who had 3 or more years of tenure on a job they had lost or left 
because of plant or company changes or moves, insufficient work, or the abolishment of their positions or 
shifts” (Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2012). For more detail on “displaced workers” see Current Population 
Survey (2012). 
30 Data for unionization and strikes and lockouts goes back further than total policing employment and this 
is represented in Graph 3. 
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 Graph 3 indicates that both unionization (r2= .932, n=39, p<.001) and strikes and 
lock-outs (r2=.818, n=39, p<.001) are statistically significantly inversely correlated to total 
policing. That is, as unionization has declined so have strikes and lock-outs while the 
number of total police per 100,000 population have increased.  In fact, while total policing 
employment has climbed by 64.8% from 1972 to 2009, strikes and lock-outs have declined 
by 99.2% and the overall unionization rate has dropped by 55.4%.  A pacification 
approach to unions would hold that these organizations play a surrogate policing role.  
Certainly, our international study reinforces these statistically significant findings 
(Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 2) – as unionization decreases, policing increases.  
Similarly, as unionization decreases so does the frequency of strikes and lock-outs 
decrease both internationally (Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) and in the USA (r2=.923, 
n=50, p<.001, not shown). 
 Not surprisingly, as both unionization and strikes and lock-outs have decreased 
consistently since the early seventies so has deindustrialization increased.  That is, as 
cumulative job losses in the industrial sector mount, so does unionization wither (r2= -
.823, n=32, p<.001, not shown) and strikes and lock-outs decrease (r2= -.691, n=32, 
p<.001, not shown).  As might be expected, this upward trend in industrial job losses has 
coincided with rising total policing employment numbers (r2= .705, n=32, p<.001).  
Graph 4 illustrates this trend line since 1972.  Again, as in our study of the relationship 
between the industrial reserve army and total policing internationally (r2=.462, n=34, 
p<.01, see Rigakos and Ergul, 2011: Table 1) more industrial unemployment coincides 
with more policing. 
  
Conclusions 
 
 At the outset of this paper we produced five testable hypotheses that were gleaned 
from our reading of Marxian political economy, studies of pacification, and our own 
previous international research.  Our aim was to examine the explanatory power of these 
approaches for assessing the relationship between policing, inequality, exploitation, 
unionization, strikes and lock-outs, and deindustrialization in the USA over the last four 
decades.  This empirical assessment used existing macroeconomic statistics that were 
operationalized to suit our analysis and to conform to the core concepts being tested.  The 
analysis confirmed the following five hypotheses: 
 
Inequality will positively correlate to total policing; 
Surplus value will positively correlate to total policing; 
Unionization will inversely correlate to total policing; 
Unionization will positively correlate to strikes and lock-outs; and  
Cumulative deindustrialization will positively correlate to total policing. 
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When coupled with our previous international research of 45 countries for the snapshot 
year of 2004 (Rigakos and Ergul 2011) that produced almost identical results, these 
finding are simply remarkable.  The associations we have discovered are powerful and 
recurring both over time and across international borders where variations in legal 
contexts and institutional histories of policing are many and complex. The empirical 
verification of these basic tenets of a Marxian political economy of policing are significant 
for both the study of pacification as well as policing and security research more broadly. 
 Although aimed at the level of a larger political economy, the effect of increased 
policing, decreased unionization, and more inequality has profound institutional effects 
that structurally condition our everyday social relations.  As Althusser (1972: 174) once 
mused: if a police officer simply says: “Hey, you there!” in public, the individual who 
turns around “by this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion… 
becomes a subject”.  The multiplication of these institutionally mediated (interpellated) 
effects have significant implications on how we see the world, the power of ideology, and 
the rise to prominence of security as hegemony (Rigakos 2011; Rigakos and Manolov, 
2013: 16-19).  Thus, these empirical results may usefully inform a general social theory 
and resistance that increasingly identifies “policing” – broadly defined – as a core element 
of the global pacification of labour and the enforcement of capitalist relations (Neocleous 
and Rigakos, 2011).  
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